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ral histories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed,
and not the official position of MORS.
Omissions and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort is made to present the
interviewee’s own words.
Mr. Arthur H. ‘‘Trip’’ Barber, III, was
DeputyDirector of the Assessment Division
in the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (CNO) and served as the Navy MORS
Sponsor from 2005 to 2014. In 2014 he was
elected a Fellow of the Society (FS). The in-
terview was conducted on February 27,
2015 in Burke, Virginia.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Mr. Arthur H. ‘‘Trip’’
Barber, III, FS. Harrison Schramm and
Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS, interviewers
Bob Sheldon: This is February 27, 2015
and we’re here for a MORS oral history in-
terview with Mr. Trip Barber. Please tell us
your parents’ names.
Trip Barber: My parents’ names were
Arthur H. Barber, Jr., andMary CobbDiggle
Barber.
Bob Sheldon: Tell us about your parents
and how they influenced you.
Trip Barber: My parents grew up in dif-
ferent places. My father grew up in Massa-
chusetts and mymother in North Carolina.
They met in North Carolina. I was born in
Charlotte, North Carolina. My father was
a civil engineer and served in the Army
in World War II. He continued in the Army
Reserve for the rest of a 20-year career. So
there was some military influence in the
house. Mymother was relentless on educa-
tion so I was in a different school every year
from first grade through seventh grade—
two schools some years. I skipped a grade
one year because I was well past what
the school was prepared to teach. She was
relentless about pushing my intellectual
limits.
Bob Sheldon: Why were you in different
schools?
Trip Barber:My mother got mad at each
school that I attended because they weren’t
pushingme hard enough orweren’t educat-
ingme sufficiently. This wasNorth Carolina
so we’re not talking superb schools. She
kept looking for one that was (superb), so
I was in a different school every year. Then
finally when I completed seventh grade in
1963, my parents decided that they had
not lived adventurously enough and we
moved to Baghdad, Iraq.
I thought that I had died and gone to
hell, because Baghdad was not great. I
wasn’t in school for four years; I didn’t go
to school at all except for some homeschool-
ing with my father. I tried to read every
book in the US Information Agency library;
all the classics of literature.
Bob Sheldon: What was your dad’s job?
Trip Barber:He took a job as the chief en-
gineer on the construction project for build-
ing the city hospital of Baghdad.
I missed all of middle school (junior
high school). I came back to the tenth grade
and fell in with my age group. I had been
out of school for four years but missed three
grades.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go to high
school?
Trip Barber:My father finally had enough
of Iraq so he came back and took a job in Bos-
ton. Butmyparentswantedme to finish high
school in my hometown, so I went back to
Charlotte in 1967 with my mother and fin-
ished high school there.
Bob Sheldon: When you were in Bagh-
dad, did you have a chance to travel around
the Middle East?
Trip Barber: That’s a long story. We had
a variety of health problems in the family
so we went back to the United States regu-
larly. My mother was deathly afraid of air-
planes so it was always on ships. In
connection with the ship transit from Beirut
back to the United States, we certainly saw
a number of countries—not too many of
them in the Middle East but most in the
Mediterranean. I spent a lot of time on
ships, which sort of oriented me toward
the Navy. Different kind of ship, but still
a ship. I was fascinated with the sea.
I finished high school and I was way
ahead of my peers by virtue of not having
gone to junior high school and wasting all
those years and actually spending them pro-
ductively. I did really well in high school.
Bob Sheldon: I’m guessing you did well
in math and science?
Trip Barber: Yes, I did.
Bob Sheldon: Were those your favorite
subjects?
Trip Barber: Yes, those were my favor-
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my favorites. I was focused on going to theMas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). I can’t
remember a time when I didn’t want to go there
and study aero (aeronautical) engineering. That
was my focus in my high school years to make
sure I had a resume to support doing that and
that’s what I did.
Bob Sheldon: Your dad lived in Boston when
you went to school there?
Trip Barber: Yes. My dad had commuted to
Charlotte when I was in high school. As soon
as I graduated my mother moved up to Boston,
so when I was in college, my parents lived two
miles away in the Prudential Center. I didn’t live
at home but I saw them regularly. They lived in
Boston for a number of years after I graduated
until they retired.
Bob Sheldon:How did you choose aero engi-
neering as a major?
Trip Barber: I grew up in the middle of the
space race.When Iwas six, Sputnikwas launched.
From that point on the space race was consuming
America and a lot of kids in my generation grew
up wanting to be astronauts, aero engineers, or
related fields; I certainly was one of them.
Harrison Schramm:When did you build your
first rocket?
Trip Barber:When I was 10. I never outgrew
that and I’m still doing it. I was working on one
this morning. I was fascinated with aerospace
and I never considered going anyplace but
MIT to study it because it has the best aero de-
partment in the world.
Bob Sheldon: Did you build model rockets in
high school?
Trip Barber: I did. I built them in primary
school. I built them when I was in Iraq. It was
kind of hard to fly themwithout somebody firing
back so I didn’t fly too many of them over there.
Bob Sheldon:Did you build them fromkits or
from scratch?
Trip Barber: Both. And I still do that. That’s
been my hobby my whole life.
Bob Sheldon: Do you have a rocket club or
something you belong to?
Trip Barber: Yes, there’s a local rocket club
and there’s the National Association of Rock-
etry that I was the head of for a number of years.
Bob Sheldon: Besides your aero courses, did
anything else happen that you particularly re-
member about MIT?
Trip Barber: I was in Navy Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) when I was at MIT. I
looked at all the Service branches and I wanted
to serve my country. I had a draft number that
was so high that I never would have been
drafted, but I still wanted to serve because I
had lived in a place thatwas totalitarian. It tends
to make you value what you have here.
Bob Sheldon: What was your draft lottery
number?
Trip Barber: 270-something. I wasn’t going to
get drafted. I looked at all the Services and de-
cided that the culture and the people of the
Navy were the group that I wanted to hang
out with. I went into Navy ROTC on a contract.
They did not have scholarships when I entered
MIT; in fact that whole program was focused
on graduating engineering duty officers. When
I was there they began awarding scholarships
and I was the first one to get a scholarship. They
began commissioning line officers and I was the
first one to be commissioned as a line officer.
Since then they’ve become all line officers with
lots of scholarships.
It’s a big unit now—it was small then.
ROTC was an important part of my life at MIT
as was the rocket society where we spent a lot
of time building and flying rockets. I was just
at a convention this past weekend in Seattle
with six of the people that I went through MIT
with in the rocket society.
Bob Sheldon: Any other extracurricular ac-
tivities, athletics or anything, while you were
in college?
Trip Barber: I ran track and I also was part of
a military fraternal society called the Pershing
Rifles. I was the Commander of it, as a Navy
guy. We had a commando unit that went out
in the field a couple of times a month and spent
the entire weekend in the bush playing soldier. I
was the Commander of that too.
Bob Sheldon: What distance did you run in
track?
Trip Barber: Two miles and I ran cross coun-
try also. I wasn’t all that good at it but I still ran.
It got me in a position where I was more phys-
ically fit and learned to love a sport and I con-
tinued it.
Bob Sheldon: Finishing up at MIT, then you
were commissioned so you went straight into
the Navy?
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Trip Barber: I did. I had a four-year obliga-
tion. I tried a submarine cruise for my midship-
man cruise and did not like it. I was on an SSBN
and I had a 63-day submerged patrol out of
Guam. Theywere having anOperational Reactor
Safeguards Exam (ORSE) when they returned
and they were just not having a good life. ORSE
was the nuclear inspection of Navy reactors.
They were nervous and they spent the entire
cruise drilling on that.
There were no movies—you couldn’t watch
movies. Everybody’s job was to study. It was re-
ally miserable. I decided I did not want to be in
a part of the Navy where people were not hav-
ing fun. My eyes weren’t good enough to fly
back them. It’s correctable these days but it
wasn’t then. That left surface line and that’s
what I did.
Bob Sheldon:Did your aero background help
you in that field?
Trip Barber: A technical background helps
you in any career field in the Navy. I didn’t
use aero toomuch asmy profession. I was a con-
sumer of aerospace—I shot rockets as opposed
to designing them. But it was useful—to be tech-
nically proficient in the Navy is a good thing.
Harrison Schramm: They didn’t have Surface
Warfare Officers School back then; you just re-
ported straight to your first ship?
Trip Barber: That’s correct. I graduated from
college and a week later I walked on board the
USS Alacrity, which was a former minesweeper
that was in the process of being converted to
pulling a towed array sonar to detect subma-
rines. I was on board a ship as a division officer
with zero training beyond ROTC and that was
not a lot of training back then.
The MIT campus was consumed with anti-
war riots and strikes, so we maintained a low
profile. When we drilled, we drilled indoors be-
cause we attracted a large audience of mockers,
catcallers and hecklers when we tried to drill
outdoors. There was not a lot of specific training
on how to run a ship.
And here I was. I walked on board and part
of the crew had been pulled off to do Operation
End Sweep in Vietnam—cleaning up the mines
we’d laid there. The ship was undermanned.
We got underway and I was an Officer of the
Deck (OOD) in a week. This was scary be-
cause it was me and the Executive Officer
(XO) working ‘‘port and starboard’’ (alternating
duty periods).
This is something you normally spend
a long period of time to learn, but there were
only five officers on the ship so you had to learn
a lot. You learn lots of different skills as a divi-
sion officer and as a professional if you have
a very small crew, there’s nowhere to hide. That
was an eye-opening orientation to the realNavy.
My chief was an alcoholic. My leading petty of-
ficer had been busted (reduced in rank) 12 times
for drugs and had been to mast 12 times and we
didn’t kick people like him out of the Navy back
then for drugs because he was too valuable—he
had too many NECs (Navy Enlisted Classifica-
tions—specialty skills).
It was a pretty eye-opening experience. This
was not the cutting edge of the Navy.
Harrison Schramm: Where was your ship
home-ported?
Trip Barber: Charleston, South Carolina.
Harrison Schramm:Did you live on board the
ship or did you have quarters?
Trip Barber: If you were on minesweepers
back then, you rated a BOQ (Bachelor Officer
Quarters) room. I had a BOQ room, which was
good because minesweepers were miserable,
rotten, smelly, andbug-infested. Thenwedeployed
to the Mediterranean (Med) pulling a towed array
sonar with another minesweeper that was
similarly equipped and we found every Soviet
submarine in the Med.
We heard them all. It was amazing. We had
P-3s (maritime patrol aircraft) buzzing around
us and it was a remarkable experience. I was
shifted down to CIC (Combat Information Cen-
ter) and I was an Ensign division officer control-
ling entire squadronsworth of P-3s and figuring
out on-the-fly how to do target motion analysis
and track submarines and locate them on pas-
sive bearings. It was just fascinating, so I think
a strong technical background was really pretty
important to being able to execute that kind of
tasking.
Bob Sheldon: Could you put some timestamps
on this?
Trip Barber: I graduated from MIT in 1973.
Bob Sheldon: And to Southeast Asia for how
long?
Trip Barber: I did not go to Southeast Asia.
The Vietnam War had just ended. Some of the
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people on my ship’s crew who had minesweep-
ing experience when the ship had been a mine-
sweeperwere sent to Southeast Asia to be on the
minesweepers that cleaned up the mines post-
war. But the war was over.
Harrison Schramm: Do you have any strong
memories of your Captain or XO from that time?
Trip Barber: My Captain was an alcoholic.
He would regularly get the ship underway
drunk. This was a pretty broadening experience
for an Ensign. We pulled into Bermuda on the
transit across the Atlantic and the crew basically
behaved so poorly that we were ejected from
Bermuda and told to never come back. But we
sure found a lot of the Soviet submarines, and
we were the talk of the Mediterranean because
we were finding submarines that the surface
ships had never seen.
I spent 18 months there and then sought
a split tour to the ‘‘destroyer Navy’’; to the
commissioning crew of the third ship in the
Spruance class. I joined the mainstream of
the Navy at that point. But I went in with a tre-
mendous amount of operational experience
and leadership experience from being on
a very small ship. So it served me well. And
I had ASW (antisubmarine warfare) exper-
tise, which really became the focus of my
professional time at sea, on ships that did an-
tisubmarine warfare.
Harrison Schramm: Was your second ship
also in Charleston?
Trip Barber: It was in San Diego. We were
a commissioning crew so we spent 18 months
in precom (precommissioning). During those
18 months I made up for the ‘‘no SWOS’’ (I
hadn’t been to Surface Warfare Officers School)
by going to the 25 or so different Navy schools
of every type. I really built a much stronger pro-
fessional background even really to what you
get in department head school by taking all of
those different one, two- and three-week courses.
I had the opportunity fortunately at that point in
my career to bulk up on some of the professional
stuff that back then you just didn’t get a chance to
do very well.
Harrison Schramm: Can you talk qualita-
tively about life on board the minesweeper ver-
sus life on board the destroyer?
Trip Barber: Spruanceswere new, large, clean,
modern, spacious, made of steel—not wood.
And they were not infested with cockroaches.
They were the cutting edge of ship design back
then so it was fascinating to be on a new ship,
learn the combat system, and become proficient
in all the systems on a big destroyer. It was a dif-
ferent lifestyle—with a much higher class of
people. Precommissioning crews are always
hand-selected, so it was just a remarkable crew.
Everyone that was on there as a division officer
went on to command a ship. That was a great
experience.
I had a sort of bad lifestyle experience but
operationally magnificent experience on my
first ship. And then a great lifestyle experience
on my second ship. I met my wife while I was
sitting around in the BOQ in precom waiting
for my ship to be commissioned, and we got
married shortly after the ship was commis-
sioned. When I finished the tour there in 1977,
I could either have got out or taken orders to
do something new.
I chose to take orders to the Naval Postgrad-
uate School (NPS) at that point because I had
seen two ships and a lot of the Navy life. I de-
cided that although I had an engineering de-
gree, the aerospace industry was not hiring
when I graduated from college. There were just
no jobs. It was picking up a little bit at the four-
year point in the Navy, but I was liking the
Navy. So I was in no particular hurry to get
out and become a practicing engineer in place
of being a Navy officer.
I liked being a Navy officer.
Harrison Schramm: What did you study at
NPS?
Trip Barber: I wanted to study aero engineer-
ing but I wasn’t a pilot so they wouldn’t give me
orders to that. I started bargaining with the de-
tailer and he said basically ‘‘Double E (Electrical
Engineering) or stay at sea.’’ That’s how I de-
cided I was going to go study double E. I took
one double E course at MIT—I did not like it. I
got toNPS and I still did not like it. Itwas a really
hard curriculum. But I studied hard and I was
the number one person in the curriculum by
some huge margin.
Bob Sheldon:Alot ofmath inyour curriculum?
Trip Barber:Oh yes, four or five semesters of
calculus. It’s a little different math from ops
analysis. It’s much more differential equations,
Fourier and Laplace transforms. There is some
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stochastics and signal processing. But there’s
not as much probability and a lot more calculus
than ops analysis. But I’m pretty good at math
so that worked out okay. I worked hard and
did well and found out at the end of the curric-
ulum what I had not been told by the detailer.
The expectation is if you go through a curricu-
lum like that, you’re going to become an engi-
neering duty officer.
Well, I’d already been through that at MIT.
I did not want to be an engineering duty officer.
But when you come out of NPS at that point in
a SWO’s (surface warfare officer’s) career, you
go back to sea anyway. So I went back to sea. Re-
ally it did not become a factor until I was due for
my first shore orders after three years at sea af-
ter NPS.
Harrison Schramm:What year did you finish
NPS?
Trip Barber: I finished NPS in 1979.
Harrison Schramm: What was your thesis
and what do you remember about your advisor?
TripBarber: I designed fromscratch a computer-
based test-stand for rocket engines. I designed
the mechanical elements using my aero back-
ground and designed the circuits and the
computer system and wrote all the software
in machine language—that was fun—from
my double E background. I spent probably
1,000 hours building that thing to test small
rocket engines. It worked great but it took
me 1,000 hours of design, building and debug-
ging, and everything else to produce.My advisor
just signed the papers and left me alone, which is
what I wanted and all I needed.
That was indicative of how NPS went for
me. I never saw Monterey. I just saw Spanagel
Hall and Bullard Hall and the lab and my class-
rooms. Mywife tells me that Monterey is a great
place. After visits that I’ve made since then, I
agree with her. But I never would have realized
it back then. It was just hard. Double E did not
come naturally tome so I had towork very hard.
But at the end of it, I had a master’s in electrical
engineering. I went back to sea and I was on
a pathwhere theNavywas expectingme to con-
vert to engineering duty officer.
I even got a letter saying, ‘‘on reconsidera-
tion, wouldn’t you like to be a NUKE (nuclear-
power trained officer)?’’ I didn’t even answer
that one. I came due for shore duty orders in
1983, at the end of my department head tour
on the destroyer where I did ASW—we were
the test ship for the new SQQ-89 ASW system.
I spent the entire three years chasing subma-
rines with the towed array sonar and firing tor-
pedoes at them.
I was the weapons officer. I probably fired
100 antisubmarine rocket (ASROC) rocket-
assisted torpedoes. We would go down to the
AUTEC (Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation
Center) undersea range in the Bahamas for
miniwars (exercises) loaded out with 24 ASROCs,
24 additional torpedoes (both over-the-side and
helicopter) and a LAMPS (Light Armored Multi-
PurposeSystem)helicopter.We’dcomebackempty
having shot 48 torpedoes at submarines in live
combat simulations. Really chasing each other
around. It was marvelous. I had a great time.
When it was time for orders, I said to the de-
tailer, ‘‘Okay, what does it take to not do a pay-
back tour in electrical engineering? I’ll go
anywhere, whatever you need, whatever you
want. I do not want to serve a tour in electrical
engineering.’’
He said, ‘‘Well, go to the Pentagon andwork
in the programming division on the budget.’’
‘‘Okay, deal.’’ That was the organization that
we now call N80—it was called OP90 back then.
But it’s the programmers, the peoplewho do the
financial allocation of funds to build a ‘‘POM’’—a
programobjectivememorandum. Itwas detailed
program planning, making the books balance,
and learning the programs of the Navy.
Bob Sheldon: What was your military grade
then?
Trip Barber: I was a Lieutenant Commander;
I got early promoted to Lieutenant Commander
in 1980, a couple of weeks after I walked on
board the destroyer for my department head
tour; and I think it was entirely due to the class
rank I had at NPS because I had no sea time as
a department head at that point. The Navy
doesn’t normally do that. That was kind of
strange. I was a Lieutenant Commander my en-
tire department head tour and that’s the rank
with which I went into the Pentagon. I went into
the N80 ‘‘bull pen’’ to work for Rear Admiral
Charlie Prindle—a P-3 guy, like his son Brian,
who was (later) my boss in N81.
I worked for Charlie Prindle, who looked
just like Brian Prindle. Unfortunately Charlie
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Prindle died in office of cancer. I also worked for
his successor, Vice Admiral Mike Kalleres.
It was fascinating work. That was in the
heyday of the Reagan buildup. My boss would
come down to the ‘‘Pooka’’ (Pentagon slang
for cubicle) lane in the bullpen saying, ‘‘Okay,
I’ve got $10 billion to put somewhere, who’s
got an idea?’’ Reagan was just pouring the
money on the Services to build them up. I was
the weapons guy, so I was buying amazing
numbers of weapons. I was given the task of fig-
uring out how to dual source all of the produc-
tion lines for all of our major weapons, so I ran
a project to figure out how to find a secondman-
ufacturer to bring online and the Navy did it.
I had these great experiences during those
two years there where I worked on stuff that
led to the Navy spending billions of dollars
and making big decisions. I worked for great
bosses, with the best of people and a huge
amount of job satisfaction. I liked it, unlike most
people that go to the Pentagon and then whine
about how they hate it. I did not hate it. I
thought it was really rewarding, intellectually
challenging work and I liked doing it and the
people that saw me said I was good at it and
they’d like me to come back and do it again
sometime.
Harrison Schramm: Where were your spaces
physically located when you had that first Pen-
tagon job?
Trip Barber: I was on the fourth floor, D ring,
7th corridor—I don’t remember the room num-
ber. The Navy has moved counterclockwise one
wedge since back then in the course of the Pen-
tagon renovation compared to where we were
then.
Harrison Schramm: Did it look kind of the
same and have the same kind of feel that the Pen-
tagon has now, or was it significantly different?
Trip Barber:Well, the Pentagonwent through
that huge renovation since then. Did you have
a chance to see any of the Pentagon corridors be-
fore the renovation?
Harrison Schramm: Yes, when I was here the
first time I saw it.
Trip Barber: Yes, well that’s how the whole
Pentagon looked. It was grim, yellow, depress-
ing, and old.We still used pookas and theywere
almost the same as the pookas that we use to-
day. We had Wang word processors, and if
you wanted slides done you had to basically
go down to OPNAV graphics and do some
serious sucking up. You had to take some cof-
fee—cans of coffee—and make a deal if you
wanted the graphics in less than a week. So it
was different.
It was not as dominated by PowerPoint, but
we did use slides. They were just done with
a simpler system, so ‘‘Gucci’’ graphics were
not really an option unless you had serious
amounts of coffee and were willing to go down
to OPNAV graphics and get them done profes-
sionally by graphic artists. But it was fascinating
work so I liked it a lot.When I went back to sea, I
stayed in contact with the senior civilians that
were part of that organization.
Irv Blickstein was one of those, and when it
was time to come back to shore duty after my
next tour, which was an XO tour on a destroyer
in Norfolk, I called Irv and said, ‘‘Okay, what
should I do next?’’
He said, ‘‘Well, go to OSD PA&E’’ (Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and
Evaluation). But the detailer had already issued
me orders to J8 so that was a little awkward. I
tried to get out of the orders to J8—and I got some
help. This was in 1987 right after Goldwater-
Nichols had been signed into law. The Joint Staff
had suddenly changed from being a backwater
that only the failures sought duty in, to being
a place where the frontrunners were required
to have duty in order to be promotable.
It was a huge culture change that occurred,
and I was the first wave of new people who
were ordered in under the new culture and I
couldn’t get out of it. I went to interview with
David Chu who was the head of PA&E and he
said, ‘‘Yes, I’d like you to come work here.’’
Hemade a call and the answerwas ‘‘no’’. Which
was odd because people didn’t normally say
‘‘no’’ to Chu, but they did. So I ended up going
to J8.
That was right after J8 had been created, so I
was the first of the new generation of officers
there that were upwardly mobile. I came into
J8 Program and Budget Analysis Division—
which was a good fit for my background. I
had spent two years working in the details of
Navy programming. I was the only person in
the office with a background of actually know-
ing how to do this stuff.
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Bob Sheldon:Were you a Commander at that
point?
Trip Barber: I made Commander right after I
got there. I was frocked. I had been selected but
they did frocking back then so I was able to put
it on in connection with reporting for duty in
a Commander’s billet. I was there in J8 on
a three-year tour and because I knew what I
was doing I was pretty quickly put into pretty
interesting jobs and positions. I became the per-
sonwho ran thewhole Joint Staff’s participation
in the annual programreview.As aCommander,
I was telling rooms full of O-6s what to do and
how to produce the papers that I needed.
I was building these enormous briefing
books and personally briefing the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all the issues for pro-
gram review every cycle. And then when the
Chairmanwent over to testify to Congress—this
was Admiral Bill Crowe—he took me with him.
I was his backup person on budget issues.
This was really interesting stuff, it was an-
other great experience in the Pentagon where
because I chose this line of business of being
in program and budget analysis, I was having
the opportunity to do really interesting work
for really senior people who seemed to appreci-
ate it and Iwashaving some influenceondecisions.
Positive feedback from a Pentagon experience is
sort of a pattern here. If you go to the right jobs,
then Pentagon duty can be quite rewarding and
influential and that’s the kind of jobs that I was
able to get.
I got them because I asked for them—I
wasn’t trying to avoid them. If you try to avoid
them, then you get the jobs that perhaps no one
else really wanted. If you get aggressive and
look for the ones that are really interesting, well
who else is going to ask for them? At a certain
point, people figure this out and they start ask-
ing for them but in themore junior ranks it’s un-
common for people to ask for Pentagon duty, so
I did and I got it.
Toward the end of my Joint Staff tour, the
Cold War ended. Colin Powell became the
Chairman. General Powell did not need as
much prep as Admiral Crowe. Admiral Crowe
did not like budget—he was a policy guy. He
hated the budget in fact, so I was his crutch. I
would brief him and he’d sit there—he had this
odd habit of chewingKleenexes. So I’d be sitting
there giving him a budget briefing and his eyes
would be closed and the onlyway you could tell
that he was awake was that every now and then
he’d reach into his desk drawer, pull out a Klee-
nex and put it in his mouth and chew on it.
This is really disconcerting when you’re
giving somebody a budget brief. It was pretty
memorable. It was very painful for him to go
through this process, which is why I got so
many opportunities because I made it easy
for him and I took really complicated stuff
and explained it in simple terms that he
comprehended.
Bob Sheldon: What were the contentious
budget issues in that era?
Trip Barber: I don’t remember. The briefing
books that I took in there were 300 or 400 pages.
And he hated budget—so here comes this Com-
mander with 300 or 400 pages. The first time we
did that, I came in with a retinue. There were
a bunch of issues and I had various people who
had been producing papers on each of the issues
and they were the experts on them. My theory
was I’m going to run these experts through and
they’re going to brief the Chairman.
The Chairman said that would not be the
case, so I had to go brief them all. Okay. My
surprise—I was not really expecting that this
was what I was going to have to do. I was able
to do it and I did it quicker than the experts
would have done which pleased the Chairman
greatly, and I operated at a higher level with less
detail, which also pleased him. So that waswhat
I did from that point on.
Then Powell came in. I’ve worked for some
really smart people, like Admiral Denny Blair.
General Colin Powell was the smartest one.
That guy was impressive at every level, just an
awesome human being, leader, smart—an
amazing guy. It was a real challenging experi-
ence to work for him. That was a different expe-
rience. He hadworked as aWhite House Fellow
in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
so he didn’t need a whole lot of help on budget
stuff.
I could hit the high points much quicker
and he would read the paper and he’d get it—a
different kind of briefing. But the world was
changing around us at that point. It was the
end of the Cold War, so it was pretty clear that
the budget was going to go down. The Services
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were not interested in volunteering how to cut
themselves in order to accommodate what was
going to be a pretty clear peace dividend and
budget reduction.
It was part of the job that I had to be familiar
with just about everything. I was really familiar
with how we did wargaming and analysis and
all the other force structure work in different
branches within J8. I was sitting aroundwithout
much to do one day and I started noodling
about how would you change the military and
what would your theory be for how you would
change the military to accommodate a big bud-
get reduction?
I worked on it on my own for a few months
and produced a product—not a thought piece,
because I’d done a lot of calculations about
how to price things. And I’d used a lot of work
from the wargaming and force structure analy-
sis and ops analysis divisions in J8. I had a pretty
well worked out theory of how the military
ought to be reshaped. Then I showed it to theDi-
rector in J8.
A day later I was up in the Chairman’s of-
fice and I showed it to General Powell and that
became the Base Force. He picked it up and
thought of the name Base Force and made the
Service chiefs do it. But it was what the US mil-
itary did to reshape itself at the end of the Cold
War. Nobody ever knew I did it. When you read
the history of the Joint Staff of that particular
thing—they actually wrote a history of it. My
name is nevermentioned. Awhole bunch of col-
onels and generals are mentioned. They had es-
sentially nothing to do with it other than to not
get in the way.
Bob Sheldon:How did you come up with the
ideas for the Base Force?
Trip Barber: I made it up. I looked atwhat the
world situation was, figured out what I thought
the US military needed to do, used the analytic
capabilities of the Joint Staff to figure out what
kind ofmilitary it would take. Imean, I got down
to the company level (Army) of our force struc-
ture. I had to learn Army force structure in great
detail to figure out how many people the Army
needed to have in order to do that. I did the same
for the Marine Corps and earned a lifelong set of
‘‘bulls eyes’’ from the Marine Corps for saying
that they really only needed to be 150,000. There
are Marines who still remember I did that.
So that was how my Joint Staff tour ended,
producing that. I ended up briefing it around
a lot. I took it over to the OMB and briefed it
to the senior leadership there. I briefed it to lots
of the senior leaders within the Department of
Defense. In fact the day I left the Joint Staff to
go back to sea and Command, they had a big
farewell party for me.
I went over and had lunch and they were
serving champagne—so I had a couple of
glasses of champagne. And I came back to the
Pentagon and was told that at 5:00 that evening,
I had to give a briefing on the Base Force to the
entire assembled senior staff of the OSD Comp-
troller organization. And after that I could de-
tach from the Joint Staff that evening.
Bob Sheldon:One of your best briefings ever?
Trip Barber: Yes, well I sobered up. So the
Joint Staff tour was pretty exciting. I had a great
time.
Bob Sheldon: When did that end?
Trip Barber: It ended in 1990.
Bob Sheldon: Just before Desert Storm.
Trip Barber: Yes. I went into the command
pipeline as Desert Storm was going on. I got to
watch it on TV. I went off tomy command—USS
Deyo—a Spruance class destroyer. All of my sea
tours after the original minesweeper were on
Spruance class destroyers. I was on the commis-
sioning crew of the third one—USS Kinkaid (DD
965). I was on the USS Moosbrugger (DD-980) as
a department head. I was on USS Stump (DD-
978) as an XO.
Then I was on USS Deyo (DD-989) as the
Commanding Officer (CO). Every one of those
ships was doing test and evaluation (T&E) on
ASW systems until I got toDeyo. Deyowas a fully
mature Spruance where every space had been
filled, every system had been installed; it had
Tomahawks (Sea launched Surface-to-Surface
Missiles); it had the Classic Outboard SIGINT
(Signals Intelligence) system. Every space was
just stuffedwith equipment, whereas the initial
Spruance I had served on in 1976, most of the
spaces were empty.
Bob Sheldon: You talked about T&E—did
you monitor the T&E activities on the ships you
were aboard?
Trip Barber: Yes, I was the director of the
ship’s participation in T&E on USSMoosbrugger.
Bob Sheldon:Did youwatch the data gathering?
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Trip Barber: Yes. I wasn’t working with the
engineers. I was working with the crew to learn
how to use the new systems and then to run the
demonstrations, the test and trials, and then
eventually free play exercises to prove whether
they did or didn’t work. There was a civilian
data-collection staff on board. My job was to
train and operate the crew to use the systems
and the data collection staff collected the data
around what we did.
Harrison Schramm: Just for completeness,
where was Deyo home ported?
Trip Barber: She was in Charleston.
Harrison Schramm: Did you deploy to the
Gulf?
Trip Barber: I took command on a deploy-
ment in the Mediterranean. Desert Storm had
ended and we were out there, and basically
the rest of the fleet had come home. Most of
the fleet had surged there for the war. Deyo
had not surged. We were in the group that went
out and had to relieve the people who fought
the war. So we got to have the party. We did
the grand tour of the European North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) ports and got to
celebrate the victory.
We were the only Tomahawk shooter in the
Med to sort of keep a lid on Saddam Hussein
with the threat of Tomahawks. It was our job
to be the Tomahawk shooter on patrol in the
Med and to enjoy the victory celebration. We
had a great deployment, all in the Med.
Harrison Schramm: Which of those ports in
the Med is your most memorable as a ‘‘good
port’’?
Trip Barber: I took command in Cannes
(France) across the 4th of July. Therewas amajor
celebration—first of the victory, second of US/
French friendship, and third of the 4th of July.
We marched in formation in uniform down
the streets of the city with color guard and ev-
erything with the crew. The guy I was relieving
said, ‘‘You take that one. I’m not doing it.’’ So I
had a pretty good first port visit when I was
the PCO (Prospective Commanding Officer).
They didn’t really get any better than that.
They were all pretty good but that one was tops.
Like I said, it was the postwar victory celebra-
tion so that was not an arduous deployment.
Subsequent to that when we came home I had
a couple of counter-narcotics patrols down in
the Caribbean. I got a fair amount of operating
time on USS Deyo. And then all command tours
end.
It was time for orders again. I wanted to go
to the war college—I ended up at Army War
College (AWC) for a variety of reasons, which
ended up being a pretty good experience. That’s
in farm country in Pennsylvania.
Bob Sheldon:What year were you at Carlisle?
Trip Barber: I enteredAWC in 1993 and grad-
uated in 1994. I got orders to N81—I really
didn’t know what that was but it was in the
N8 and they worked on programming stuff. I
said, ‘‘Okay, send me in, coach.’’
Bob Sheldon: What grade were you at that
time?
Trip Barber: I had been selected for Captain
at the end of my command tour and put it on
at AWC so I arrived in N81 as a Captain. I found
that Bill Owens had been theN8, and he had just
left to become the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. He had established this phenom-
enally complicated assessment process that had
joint mission area and support area assess-
ments. I forget their names but they were func-
tional area assessments by warfare area. There
was this elaborate process of assessments going
on and N81 was leading the comprehensive as-
sessment of the Navy program. As part of that
there were a number of major briefings that
N81 produced.
I was the 812 deputy branch head. The ac-
tual branch headwas a Senior Executive Service
(SES) civilian named Bruce Powers who gave
me free rein. I was running a good piece of
N81 within a few months because I knew what
I was doing and the assessment process was
kind of what I had been doing in the Joint Staff.
It was a pretty large effort that drew on people
from throughout all of N81 and also throughout
the Navy to produce these assessments. We
would produce assessment briefings that were
in the custom of the time.
Remember, this was a legacy from Bill
Owens, and Bill Owens had apparently an infin-
ite bladder and an iron butt because he thought
an eight-hourmeetingwas just fine. Hismethod
of achieving consensus was to feed people
fluids and not let them take head breaks until
they agreed. He could take it and most of his
counterparts couldn’t. He achieved victory or
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consensus bureaucratically by a variety of tech-
niques. He had founded a process where the ex-
pectation was the briefs were long and senior
leader patience was infinite and there was no
detail too small to be covered.
This was not good training really for the
way that N81 operates. Somehow or other, I be-
came the briefer for all of those and I was the
sole briefer for eight hours—500 slides covering
an assessment of every dimension of the Navy
program from aviation depot maintenance to
undersea warfare to C4ISR. I had to learn so
much in the process of assembling those assess-
ments of how are we doing and what program-
matic adjustments we couldmake to do better at
the expense of cutting what to pay for it.
This is kind of what an N81 does today and
has always done. But I walked into a situation
where for whatever reason, the customwas that
therewould be one briefer, the briefs were going
to be very long, and the decision was that I
would be it.
Bob Sheldon: You had people working for
you giving you enough information that you
were comfortable briefing those eight hours’
worth of details?
Trip Barber: Yes. It was essentially the same
thing as anO-6 inN81 as I ended updoingwhen
I came back as the SES deputy division director.
Backwhen Iwas there as anO-6, themost senior
SES who was there as ‘‘associate director’’ (it
was Bob Hallex at the time) was a technical di-
rector only. He ran contracting or whatever—I
don’t know. I never had anything to do with
him.Hewas not influential in shaping our assess-
ment output products and the Admiral was gen-
erally clueless. Bruce Powers was there as my
direct SES boss underhimandhewas a very good
mentor who gave me essentially carte blanche to
go make things happen. It was a great experience
andahugeopportunity and really rewardingpro-
fessionally. I did that for four POM cycles; I was
there three years and eight months.
I just happened to catch the timing right to
get four cycles in each of two three-and-a-half-
year tours. I had long tours in the Pentagon in
these kinds of jobs accumulating an awful lot
of run time and experience. The audiences that
I would brief would be 200 or 300 people.
The culture back then was that all of the ad-
mirals gathered together and they listened to
somebody brief for eight hours. It’s remarkable.
We don’t do that anymore. I don’t think it was
a good use of everybody’s time. But for the per-
son who was stuck putting together and doing
those briefings, it was just an amazing educa-
tional experience.
Bob Sheldon: Was that brief in the Pentagon
proper or the Navy Annex—where would you
put 200 people in the room?
Trip Barber: I’m trying to remember where
the spaces were. We couldn’t find a single space
in the Pentagon that we could do that, so we
would go to some offsite location—various dif-
ferent conference centers. And then upon com-
pletion of the multihundred-person briefing
which was at the one-star, two-star level, we
would take it on the road and get on an airplane
and fly to Hawaii and brief it at PACFLT (US Pa-
cific Fleet). Get on an airplane and fly to London
andbrief it toNAVEUR (USNaval Forces, Europe),
and take a helicopter down to Norfolk and brief it
to LANTFLT (US Atlantic Fleet) back then.
NAVEUR wasn’t so big, but at PACFLTand
LANTFLT, the audience there was 100 people.
And it was an all-day brief. So you’d brief the
same thing repeatedly.
Bob Sheldon: Did you have to field conten-
tious questions?
Trip Barber: Oh yes, people were furious.
Our job was to say things as they were, not as
they wished they would be and we had to tell
people that your program is ugly. Andwe really
shouldn’t do this anymore and we need money
to go and do this other thing that you didn’t
want to do. It’s the same drill that N81 has cus-
tomarily done—that’s the job. To use analytic
techniques to find the best places to spend a fi-
nite number of dollars and tell people why
you believe that and show the proof and take
the hostile shots back in terms of ‘‘I don’t agree
with you.’’
The difference was that back then we didn’t
have a strong analytic capability within the
Navy, so it was more assessment than analysis.
We had only a modest number of studies that
we did ourselves and we thought of the topics
ourselves. Everybody else had their studies
too so there were a lot of dueling analyses of
‘‘my study is better than your study.’’
Thatmade it a littlemore sporting to convince
leadership that the N81 position was superior.
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I learned a lot from that experience of how you
structure an analysis, how you do analysis that’s
persuasive. And I don’t just mean doing the
study itself; how do you organize yourself bu-
reaucratically so you’re in a position where the
work when you do it is persuasive and effec-
tive and influential.
The way I ended up operating when I was
in N81 was based on experience learned over
lots of tours doing things that didn’t work out
very well. And taking a lot of slings and arrows
from people that were irritated and in some
cases with justification that perhaps what we
had done was less than perfect or less than com-
plete and we hadn’t considered all the relevant
viewpoints.
It was very educational. Back then N81 was
smaller than it is today. And really it was only
the 812 branch that produced these briefings.
We drew on support and parts of the briefings
were produced by other groups within N81
but when it came time to build the briefing it
was N812 and there were eight of us so it was
tough work. We would pile the pizza boxes up
at night. By the end of an annual cycle there
would be a pile of empty pizza boxes taller than
a human. The metric by which we tracked the
difficulty of an individual POM cycle was the
height of the stack of pizza boxes. There were
a lot of late hours and weekends associated
with howwe operated then. I learned a lot from
that too.
I was able to take those kinds of lessons
when I ultimately came back as a deputy in
N81 and get us off that mode of working all
night. If you organize yourselves correctly and
use people the right way, there’s no need to
work all night in most jobs at the Pentagon.
Bob Sheldon: Any stellar people you worked
with at that time?
Trip Barber: One of my strong action officers
was Doug Biesel who made Flag in the subma-
rine force. He was probably the strongest of
them. But N81 was not a place like N80 where
people go as a touchstone on their way to Flag.
N81 did not have a strong track record of people
going through and going on to Flag. Some do
but it’s not as pervasive as it is in N80, so back
then you didn’t get asmany superstars, but they
were good people and a number of them had
OA (operations analysis) degrees.
But not many—N81 has varied over the
years in its emphasis in having a degree in
OA. Basically at that point it was, I wouldn’t
say inadvertent, but it was not a priority so we
probably had a handful but it wasn’t verymany.
That was another thing that I changed when I
became the deputy there. We were going to get
OA degrees there, andwanted people who have
them, so we upped the percentages by quite
a bit, but back then it was a very small percent-
age. It was basically people on their first Penta-
gon tour who had to learn this stuff on the job.
Bob Sheldon: From the Pentagon, what was
your next job after that?
Trip Barber: I screened for Major Command
Ashore—so I went on to command the Navy
Amphibious Base at Little Creek, Virginia. That
was fun. I was there four months and then the
phone rang and I was told that I was going to
be detached fromduty and sent toNaval Station
Norfolk to take command and to merge Naval
Station Norfolk with Naval Air Station Norfolk
into a single base. We were in the process back
then of doing regionalization of shore facilities
from individual bases doing everything on their
own to where all the services and functions
were regionalized across the whole region. Indi-
vidual base COs became the programmanagers
for a particular function for the whole region,
and they didn’t own some of those functions
on their own base.
It’s a different theory. It’s what we’re doing
still today. I was there at a time of great change
and arrived aboard at Little Creek at the time
that began. I was the functional area manager
for the police and fire for Hampton Roads so I
figured out how to do that—that was entertain-
ing to learn the culture of cops and firemen. I got
that regionalized and did pretty well at it. I got
picked then, based on that exposure, by Admi-
ral Reason to be the CO of the Naval Base and
to do the one really hard thing that was part of
regionalization which was to disestablish Naval
Air Station Norfolk as a separate base.
The Naval Station and the Naval Air Station
were two separate bases on the same base. There
was no fence between them. On one side of the
base is the Air Station with a big airfield. It’s run
by Naval Aviation and they have their culture.
Then over here are the piers and its Naval Sta-
tion, and it’s run by SWOs and they have their
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culture. They fought with each other and they
did everything differently between the two of
them. They puzzled the hell out of their tenants
because when you cross the street, the service
deliverywas different. Really?Why? The two ba-
ses’ staffs didn’t like each other, didn’t get along,
had fundamentally different cultures and I was
told to take charge and merge them.
So I did that.
Harrison Schramm: What year was that?
Trip Barber: That was 1998 through 1999.
Harrison Schramm: That would be around
the time that I was reporting for my first sea duty
squadron at HC-6 inHangar LF-59 (OnboardNa-
val Air Station Norfolk).
Trip Barber: Yes, that was a lot of fun. As
a SWOI took commandof theNavalAir Station—
which theNavalAviation uniformly hated seeing.
And then five minutes later ordered the flag
hauled down and that was the end of Naval
Air Station Norfolk.
Bob Sheldon: How did you resolve the con-
flicting priorities between the aviation side
and the surface side?
Trip Barber: Team building—I just said,
‘‘Okay, whichever one does it the best, that’s
the way we’re both going to do it now.’’ I made
sure that the staff ended up with department
heads thatwere about 50 percent fromNaval Sta-
tion, 50 percent from Naval Air Station. I picked
the best ones between them. I went to visit every
single air squadron and every single tenant com-
mand on the Naval Air Station. I also visited ev-
ery single ship and there were 80 ships home
ported at Naval Station Norfolk—five carriers.
I had lunch with the wardroom (officers)
and talked to the crew of every ship, the same
with every air squadron, and I did something
for everybody. No matter what their number
one gripe was, I fixed it if I could. Some of them
were unfixable so I had to do something smaller.
But where I could do something, I would do
something so they knew I was listening. When
you do that you get over a lot of suspicions that
people have about what your motives are, ‘‘Oh,
you’re a SWO, I don’t trust you.’’
Because theNaval Air Station COs had been
C-12 pilots they got a chance to go flying. And
their priority was ‘‘let’s go fly.’’ Theywere awful
at running a base. It wasn’t hard to beat that. I
quickly convinced the air squadrons that having
a SWO CO was better than what they’d had be-
fore and it worked out. It was dramaticallymore
efficient and it just resolved a lot of petty things
that had been going on at that base for 60 years.
That was a fun tour and it came to an endwhen I
got a phone call from the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations—Admiral Don Pilling—saying I
want you to come be my executive assistant
(EA) in two weeks.
That was the end of that. Admiral Pilling
had been a Flag Officer at various ranks in the
N8 organization duringmy time as an action of-
ficer at various ranks. Irv Blickstein—who I
mentioned earlier as an SES—was his deputy
at N8. Once again there was this conspiracy to
take people who know how to do the stuff we
do in the Pentagon with program and budget,
and recycle them into payback, repeated tours
of doing it. N8 doesn’t do that well anymore;
it sort of died out when Pilling departed the ser-
vice and Irv retired from Navy SES.
But at the time that I was there, there was
a deliberate recycle program to keep bringing
back the people who do it well, give them the
next chance at the next pay grade up to do it
well again. So Admiral Pilling brought me back
to be his EA.
Bob Sheldon: How many stars did he have?
Trip Barber: He had four stars—he was the
Vice Chief. His hopewas that I wouldmake Flag
but I didn’t. At the end ofmy tour he retired and
I said, ‘‘You know, the next thing I need to do is
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).’’ I had
been actually in the Pentagon for all of them
from the beginning if you count the Base Force
as one and the Bottom-Up Review as one—they
weren’t technically. But effectively by virtue of
what they did, they covered the same material
that is covered in what we now call a QDR.
The first QDR by that name officially was
1997 and I was there for that in N81. The next
one was 2001 and the Navy QDR was going to
be handled by a special group detailed for one
year to serve under a Flag Officer detailed for
that purpose, serving as a team within the N8
organization called the N8 QDR division. That
Flag Officer was Joe Sestak. I was his deputy
for the QDR 2001—and that was quite an expe-
rience. Joe Sestak was a very smart person. He
earned a PhD at Harvard and he was a driven
man, relentless, brilliant, hard driving, and utterly
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remorseless to his staff. Hewas in fact brutal to his
staff. He was charming to his superiors and abu-
sive to his subordinates. That QDR was quite the
experience to be his deputy, becausewe had about
30 people on the team and I was sort of the buffer
between them and Joe Sestak. By the way, he was
a SWOandactually, until Iworked for him, hewas
a friend; as a social companion he was a great guy.
When you were his subordinate, not so
much. I didn’t know that about him until I
was his deputy. But we still remain on pretty
good terms and he was not abusive to me, so I
was really trying to moderate his behavior to
the staff, and I talked to him privately about it.
Of course hewas incorrigible about his personal
behavior being abusive to people and driving
them to work all night. But I would run him
out of the office at midnight or so and I would
stay all night to finish the projects that he
wanted with a small number of staff as opposed
to everybody that he wanted me to keep.
I really ameliorated the abusive behavior to
the best that I could for the staff and we pro-
duced amazing results out of that QDR. That
was when Donald Rumsfeld came in with Steve
Cambone—who was his ‘‘man.’’ He was not in
an official office but the guy that sat outside the
Secretary of Defense’s office. Every Secretary of
Defense has his guy who is his hatchet man.
Theycameinbentonenforcingtransformation—
whatever that means. That was the term. ‘‘Rods
from God,’’ bombs from space, whatever was
going to make current forms of military art ob-
solete. We would use pervasive intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and kill
them with precision weapons—all wars would
be won that way.
They had already decided that eight carriers
was about all that the Navy really needed. In the
QDR team we said the Navy will have no less
than 11 ships at the end of the QDR and we al-
ready know their names. It’s USS Nimitz, USS
Vinson, etc., the names of all 11 carriers. And at
the end of the QDR that’s what we had. Sestak
and the team and I were absolutely and shame-
lessly relentless in our ability to build briefings
that substantiated analytically the case for air-
craft carriers, and proved their utility both from
history and from campaign analysis.
We wouldn’t get on people’s calendars.
Sestakand Iwouldgo into their office, andbasically
just barge in and give them briefings. Sestak was
just shameless and pushy about this. But I
learned a lot from the experience. There is no
such thing as too fast in the Pentagon. If you
get a job, do it now. Do it right now. In fact if
you have to work all night to do it now, then
do that. It’s just amazing how effective you
can be if you’re quick. I should say if you’re
quick, eloquent and accurate—but he did not
care about the accurate part. That was my job.
I made sure we were never ‘‘not accurate’’ and
he made sure that we were eloquent. We had
sort of a truce agreement that we would never
say stuff that was wrong as long as I gave him
stuff that was right as quick as he wanted it.
That was pretty much the deal that we had
and we were just amazingly effective. And at
the end of the QDR, we had the 11 carriers. That
was not how it looked like it was going to turn
out at the start. He made a second star out of
that. I got a Distinguished Service Medal, which
is an unusual military award for an O-6.
But we did amazing stuff. And we certainly
whipped ourselves hard to do it and whipped
our staff hard. I still remain in contact withmost
of the people that were in the QDR staff with
me. We have a shared bond of endurance in
the face of that kind of pressure. We did well
for the Navy. That was probably the hardest
QDR that there has been in terms of direct
straight up challenge to Navy. Others have
had the ritual challenge of, oh, aircraft carriers
are so obsolete.
But on that one they had come in and they
had already made their minds up what the an-
swer was and they were going to shift all that
money to hyper-velocity whatevers from space
but they couldn’t figure out the programmatics
to make them happen. It turned out well for us.
And I retired at the end of that. I was at my 28-
and-a-half-year point
Bob Sheldon: What year was that?
Trip Barber: 2001. My retirement date was 1
January 2002. The QDR basically was over right
before 9/11. I was in the Pentagon on 9/11 in the
QDR spaces, and then the QDR report got
a hasty rewrite to adjust to the new sudden
emergence of a new different kind of war right
at the very end. But essentially all the analytic
work and all the programmatics were done by
9/11. We were in the QDR spaces on 9/11 and
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. ARTHUR H. ‘‘TRIP’’ BARBER, III, FS
Military Operations Research, V21 N2 2016 Page 49
watching TV and saw the World Trade Center
got hit by an airplane. We thought it was an aw-
ful accident. Thenwe saw it got hit with another
airplane.
Okay, this is not an accident. And then the
building (Pentagon) shook. And we knew we’d
been hit and we knew what had done it.
Bob Sheldon:What space were you in for the
QDR?
Trip Barber: I was one-and-a-half wedges
over from where the airplane hit. You could feel
it and the smoke eventually drove us out but we
weren’t engulfed in the fire or anything. Then I
went on terminal leave not too long after that.
Bob Sheldon: What was your first job post-
retirement?
Trip Barber: That was interesting. I did
a bunch of job interviews having no expectation
that I would stay around Navy because I just
didn’t think I would. I didn’t want to be a GS-
something-or-other pushing papers in the Penta-
gon, not doing anything particularly influential. I
went out on the job market to all the different
companies that did defense consulting and the
federally funded research and development cen-
ters (FFRDCs): RAND and CNA (Center for Na-
val Analyses). I got job offers from every one of
them. It was just a question of, ‘‘Okay, who do I
really want to work for?’’
I was working my way through that intel-
lectually and doing some more interviews to
see who do I like, whose culture do I like and
looking at the salaries. And then I got the call
saying, ‘‘We have a plan here,’’ from Navy. It
was from Ken Miller who was the SES deputy
N6/N7 (Warfare Requirements and Programs).
The Navy staff has gone through lots of reorga-
nizations over the years. At that time Vern Clark
had decided that the N8 organization—which
Owens had founded and had the platform
sponsors in it, and all the people who own ships
and airplanes and buy them—was too powerful
and it should be split. The N8 would handle
money only and the N6/N7 would be estab-
lished to handle all the platforms—the surface
warfare, air warfare, submarine warfare, and
so forth.
That divergence—that split—had hap-
pened shortly after Vern Clark took over as
CNO and right around the time I retired. So
there was this new organization called N6/N7
and they established an integration division
called N70 and they were just standing it up.
It was a relatively small division. Rear Admiral
Dan Bowler was the head of the division and
they needed a deputy.
Ken Miller, the N6/N7 three star’s deputy,
called me and said, “Wewant you to be the dep-
uty in this new N70 as an SES civilian. This is
a new billet.” I said, ‘‘Okay, that sounds pretty
interesting.’’ So I turned down all the job offers
and took that one. I became an employee of
CNA for nine months from January through
September of 2002 working in N70 awaiting
the approval process. This was a new SES billet,
and it’s hard to create new SES billets because
there’s a fixed number and to create a new one
means taking away another one. I was approved
and was sworn in as an SES in October 2002.
That was the beginning of my career as an
SES, which then lasted 12 years.
Bob Sheldon: You never really interacted
with CNA-proper on Seminary Road?
Trip Barber: I was there once. Yes, I went over
there to sign some paperwork and become an
employee of CNA and I spent three hours
there—I think. I went back to the Pentagon
and that was the last time I set foot in CNA as
an employee. Subsequently, after I came over
to N81, I became the COTR—the Contracting
Officer’s Technical Representative—responsible
for CNA contracts. I had a close and intimate re-
lationship with CNA starting then. But at that
point, I had no other relationship with them. I
spent three hours there.
Bob Sheldon: Did you have to go to any
charm schools for your SES training?
Trip Barber: I went to the new Flag Officer/
SES orientation program that is a two-week ori-
entation program that all new Flags and SESs go
to. I was spared from my job for enough time to
go to that grudgingly, and then back into the
chains and get back to work. I never went to
Capstone, APEX (an Office of Personnel Man-
agement (OPM) program for new SES) or any
other extended education or training. The
swearing-in process was I went over to the
Navy Annex and some GS-5 pulled a US flag
on a little stick out of her desk and said, ‘‘Okay,
raise your hand.’’ [Laughter]
There was not a lot of formality associated
with it. It was not one of those feel good things.
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It was basically, ‘‘We’re going to ride you hard
and we’re not going to take any breaks from
work here.’’
Harrison Schramm:At what point in your ca-
reer did you think, ‘‘Hmm, maybe I’ll wake up
one day and be the Navy’s senior analyst.’’
Did you ever think that this might happen for
you as you were coming up?
Trip Barber:No, I didn’t really have that spe-
cific aspiration. I admired the SESs that I had
worked with. I always thought of them as the
‘‘Sea Daddys.’’ They were the guys who were
there who knew how things worked that you
could go to and figure out how to get things
done. And when you were ready to come back
to the Pentagon and youwanted to knowwhere
you should go that would be interesting and
useful, you’d call them. Because the Flags
change—I mean they rotate. Everybody else ro-
tates, but the SESs stay there. I came to respect
them a great deal.
There were a number of them that I felt that
way about—Irv Blickstein and Matt Henry be-
ing among them. But they were always just sort
of up there. I never visualizedmyself as being in
that role, although that’s how I ended up. I ad-
mired them a lot and I really thought that what
they did was impressive and they were the peo-
ple that actually made the staff work.
Harrison Schramm: Now the majority of our
work is contractor supported—at what point
did that shift over? Was that gradual or was
there a culminating event?
Trip Barber: It progressed over time as
OPNAV’s size was reduced and the surround-
ing bureaucracy from the PPBE (Planning, Pro-
gramming, Budgeting, and Execution) process
increased. Money was eventually added to the
system to buy labor, in place of the government
people that might have done it. But the labor re-
quirements had gone up and the number of gov-
ernment people had gone down. To address the
mismatch between those two that grew over
time, money was added as a lubricant.
The money bought services, which eventu-
ally became contractors and the expectations
of the complexity of the work that you would
do grew over time. Frankly it reached the point
where it is todaywhere it’s justnot realistic to expect
officers who are coming in from the fleet—who
may or may not have an OA degree—to figure
out how to run six DOF (degrees of freedom)
models of missile intercept and similar things.
That’s just the entering standard of the quality
and depth for the work that’s expected.
It takes years to figure out how to do that
and you don’t have years to learn how to do that
on your typical officer’s tour. It’s just a combina-
tion of factors that led to where we are today.
There’s more of a story today. I’ll try to do that
as we go through some of my progression here
in my SES career. But the amount of money that
became available for contract staff became quite
large.
Bob Sheldon: When did you start picking up
the jargon of the ops analysts?
Trip Barber: To some extent even in my first
Pentagon tour, because in that first Pentagon
tour one of my collateral duties was to run the
Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirements (NNOR)
process—that big OA process by which the
Navy calculates how many munitions it needs.
Back then, N80 was responsible for it and I
was the Lieutenant Commander in N80 who
was the weapons programmer and that was
my job. They used these big linear program
models that I had to learn all about.
I had two jobs and therewere two sets ofmy
duties. One was a weapons programmer. The
other was the fleet operations programmer. So
I had to learn how to program the amount of
money that was needed for the fuel and spare
parts and so forth to our ships; there was just
no particular explanation, other than experi-
ence, for why we put the amount of money that
we did against those lines. I had to invent
a model that estimated how much money it ac-
tually took to run the Navy’s ships.
I had to build that model on a computer
program in my office. That’s ops analysis. To
me it was just writing a computer program. I
know how to do this. Frankly the math is easier
than electrical engineering (EE)—easier than
MIT. It’s just a little different. I didn’t have some
of the jargon but I knewmost of the things at the
Pentagon level that you did. The kinds of things
that you learn how to do in the graduate pro-
gram in OA are not typically the same kinds
of things that you do to execute the tasks in
the Pentagon. The Pentagon lives on Excel. Ba-
sic calculations—and I knew how to do those
from engineering.
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Really from my very first tour I was doing
calculations for quantities required and the
price of those quantities. Certainly in J8 I did
a fair amount of that as well, particularly build-
ing the Base Force. And then when I got to N81
as a Captain, Branch Head, of course, I arrived at
an organization where the culture was ops analy-
sis. And I fell in on it. Now the way that the Navy
officer classification system works, with proven
subspecialties, my experience in the program-
ming business was called ops analysis.
The broad category of officer specialty that
is ops analysis includes people who do pro-
gramming. And people who do straight models
are also classified as OA. I had an OA subspe-
cialty by proven performance in financial pro-
gramming.
Bob Sheldon: Was it a P-code?
Trip Barber: It’s not a P-code if you don’t
have a graduate degree—it’s an S-code. I had
S-code in ops analysis because of my program-
ming time, so it’s all the same in the broad def-
inition of that broader officer subspecialty code;
programming and ops analysis are the same
thing. They’ve diverged from that now—the
people who are in N80 are largely classified as
financial managers but back then it was ops
analysis. I thought OA was cool; I liked this
stuff.
The N8 organization under Bill Owens was
gathered inwhat had previously been three-star
platform sponsor ‘‘barons’’ and made them two
stars subordinate to the N8. This made N8 a gi-
gantic organization that was not only the finan-
cial managers but also the owners of all the
platforms and all those requirements in one
mega-organization that his mega-brain was ca-
pable of running. Vern Clark came aboard as
CNO said, ‘‘I don’t like this. That’s too much
power for one person. I think the Navy has been
broken and I don’t like it, so I’m going to change
it.’’ So he split the platform sponsors off in a new
organization calledN6/N7—merged themwith
the N6 which is the C4I organization. He did
that right as I retired.
This led my organization to be the
N70—which was the integrator of that N6/N7
organization with all the platform sponsors that
I discussed previously. N6/N7 produced Spon-
sor Program Proposals (SPPs) that got merged
by the N8 organization into an overall Navy
POM. I was down in the N6/N7 organization
as an integrator and a programmer. I had to
build an SPP and brief an SPP. We also had
our own analysis capability because Admiral
Clark mistrusted the N8 so much for whatever
reason.
CNO Clark also split out the manpower ac-
counts (N1) and readiness accounts (N4), took
them away from the N6/N7, and gave them to
the N1 and N4, respectively. But I still had
a pretty huge amount of the Navy’s money—
almost all of the Navy’s procurement budget.
And we had our own analysis shop. N81 was
doing analysis as well and it pleased Admiral
Clark to have competing analysis—he called it
‘‘creative friction.’’ I won’t repeat what I called
it because you’d have to excise it from the
transcript.
It was not pleasant to be at the point of fric-
tion. He enjoyed having battling briefings be-
tween N70 and N81 on the direction we
should go. He made it even more special by
making Joe Sestak N81—the guy who liked to
tell eloquent stories and was not troubled if
they’re not accurate. He usedN81 to create anal-
ysis that substantiated the story he wanted to
tell that sounded really good. And I was in
N70 saying basically, ‘‘That is crap. That’s not
true. That’s not correct. Where did you come
up with that?’’
We had these briefing battles. I would be the
briefer. Sestak would never engage me in
a head-on debate—he’d lose and he knew it.
So he’d send his O-6s to do the counterpoint
brief in front of CNO. This amused Admiral
Clark. He thought it was great. I did not. The
people in N81 were treated the way that he
treated the QDR team in 2001. They worked
all night, they produced 2,000-slide briefs with
hyperlinks and they worked relentlessly. He
would change briefings and make people work
48 hours straight. The briefings were amazing
on their graphics and eloquence. And the mo-
rale of N81’s people was in the basement be-
cause they were being forced to do things that
were simply not true (and they knew it) to pro-
duce answers that sounded good. Those were
the stories that Sestak wanted to tell CNO, that
he believed. The N81 people were not feeling
good about life because they knew what they
were doing was intellectually dishonest, and
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they were being abused in the process. Sestak
was Admiral Clark’s hero, so he got promoted.
I was at the other side of the table in these
debates. And we tried to carve out lanes. At
the staff level, none of us liked it. Nobody in
N81, and nobody in N70 liked it, and we tried
to work out lanes wherewe’d agree that, ‘‘Okay,
you do this and I’ll do that. Wewon’t fight.’’ But
there were still points where we overlapped be-
cause we were forced to and we had briefing
battles.
It was not a good experience and not effi-
cient. After I’d been in N70 two-and-a-half
years, Admiral Sestak got promoted to be the
N6/N7—my new boss. When he was an-
nounced as the N6/N7, I went to my boss and
I said, ‘‘I quit. I’m leaving. I’m never working
for this guy again, ever, and you can’t make
me because I’m a civilian now so I’m out of
here.’’ They said, ‘‘No, wait a minute. Don’t do
that. Don’t be rash. Let’s work on this.’’
They went off and worked on it, and the
deal was announced that the day Sestak became
N6/N7 and put on the third star, I would leave
N6/N7 and take over as deputy in N81. The
previous deputy in N81—Greg Melcher—fleets
up to be the acting N81 until the Flag Officer
came in. Sestak walked in the door; I walked
out the door. I went over to N81 and found
a train wreck. And he went over to N6/N7
and commenced to abuse the staff there in the
same manner that he abused the N81 staff ex-
cept that he was abusing admirals now, not
O-6s. And Admiral Clark apparently thinks this
is all good.
Myfirst Flag boss inN81was SamLocklear—
he arrived after two or three months. He said
that we have to go off and have an off-site
and figure out how to heal and how to get back
to being normal human beings who don’t pro-
duce deceitful analysis and can regain our self-
respect. Sam Locklear is a marvelous leader of
human beings. We embarked on the healing
process and the rebuilding of self-respect of
N81. But we’re still at odds with N6/N7. And
then Admiral Clark’s tenure played out and
Admiral Mullen came aboard as a CNO in
2006—Admiral Clark had a five-year tour.
Admiral Mullen came aboard having been
the Vice Chief and having cautioned Admiral
Sestak—the three-star—to quit abusing his staff
and quit doing the things that he was doing.
Sestak did not change his behavior, so Admiral
Mullen called all the Flags and SESs together,
‘‘I’m here. I’m CNO today.’’ At the end of the
meeting, he pointed to Sestak and said, ‘‘Follow
me back to my office.’’ And he fired him.
Life got better after that. I’m told—I wasn’t
there—that the N6/N7 staff was called to-
gether by the next senior officer who was put
in charge—Rear Admiral Mark Edwards—and
he announced that Sestak hadbeenfired and there
was a standing ovation among them that went on
for five minutes. That’s a sad commentary on
a person’s leadership skills. Admiral Mullen rec-
ognized that having a separate N6/N7 and an
N8 was not efficient or effective. And he com-
menced to merge the two.
At that point I wasN81B still trying tomain-
tain lanes between N70 and ourselves. And it
was announced that the two organizations—the
N6/N7 and the N8 would be re-merged. There-
fore, N70 would be disestablished and the peo-
ple in it would be reallocated and the people in
it who did analysis got reallocated to N81. N81
grew as a result of that.
Then there was the money thing—the
merger also merged the budgets for doing
analysis—purchasing analytics services. N70
had a budget for this that came to N81—N81
also had a budget for it—and Sestak had jacked
it up dramatically when he was there. He put it
in the POM and he got current year re-program-
ming to cover his requirements and tools until
the POM showed up. Well, the POM showed
up right about the time he left.
N81 now had an influx of money from the
POM that Sestak had created, and another in-
flux of money from N70 that I had created. We
merged the two pools of money, merged the
two workforces and suddenly N81 became
pretty large and really affluent—a lot of money
to buy analytic services. It became quite the en-
gine of capability with a larger number of people.
Bob Sheldon: Approximately how much
growth?
Trip Barber: About a one-third growth. I
don’t remember the numbers because there
was another merger that happened later. I’ll
get to that in a few minutes. We ended up with
110 people when bothmergers were over. When
I served in N81 as a Captain, we were about
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50 people. N81 had become quite a bit larger
and the expectations of what they will do had
become much greater as well.
When we merged N70 with N81, we had to
agree onwhat some business rules would be be-
cause we did not want to have competing anal-
ysis again. But sponsors who own programs
need analytic support to make good decisions.
N81’s culture had been, up through Sestak,
‘‘We’ll study what we please. If you’re inter-
ested that’s great, but it’s what interests us that
matters. We know everything—we are N81 and
we are the honest brokers.’’
I did not like that term. If I am the honest
broker, who are you? The dishonest? That’s
not who we are, so don’t ever say that. But that
was very much the attitude in N81. We are the
honest brokers; we are smarter than everybody
else. And we’ll go study what interests us and
we’ll stick it in your ear and we’ll surprise you
with the results. You can imagine how well re-
ceived that was.
Of course everybody else who has pro-
grams that need analytic support is going to
go do their own analysis because first, is N81
even going to do it? And second, are they going
to trust it if N81 does? The answer to both of
those is ‘‘no.’’ That’s a recipe for creating contin-
ued conflicting analysis and chaos and frankly
inefficiency. But to do anything else implies that
N81 has a different behavior model. And I had
to figure out what that behavior model was.
Certainly working with Sam Locklear
helped me shape that. But mostly this is just
the result of what I learned overseeing different
models that didn’t work and of learning lessons
of how all these things didn’t work. And saying,
‘‘Okay, well don’t do that. And don’t do that
other thing that didn’t work either.’’ So what
does that leave? Okay, you have to try this. At
least, if you do this and it doesn’t work, it’ll be
a new mistake. Maybe it’ll work. But I know
all these other things that have been done before
didn’t work and here’s why so let’s not do that.
That’s prettymuch how the business rules came
to be created for the N81 as we know it today—
from the lessons of hard knocks of all these
other experiences of things that didn’t work.
The fact was at this point that all the ana-
lytic capability of the Navy was concentrated
in N81 and all the money to do analysis was
concentrated in N81. As a result they had to
have the culture of, ‘‘We will do your analysis
for you and you can trust us andwewill not sur-
prise you with it,’’ or the systemwas just not go-
ing to work. Sponsors would go off and,
without an analytically trained staff, theywould
find money and buy analysis and it would not
be good but it would be theirs.
To prevent that happening, I made up the
rules that N81 runs by today, which is that we
are your analytics service provider. The term I
inherited from Sam Locklear is ‘‘excellence
without arrogance.’’ That’s who we are. We’re
here to serve all. We will not surprise anybody
with the work that we do. It will all be done
openly within classification limits, obviously.
But no surprises. That doesn’t mean that you
get to control it or that it’ll be consensus, but
you will not be surprised and your viewpoints
will be reflected in the work, and if we’re wrong
we’ll admit it and we’ll change what we did.
N81 as a service provider, as opposed to
N81 as the honest broker and secret keeper,
was really the paradigm shift that I made. But
really, whoever was in that job would have
had to do it or the staff model that the Navy
had gone to at that point just would not have
worked. Now it is 2006 and we were operating
under Admiral Mullen in the model of a single
‘‘uber N8’’ and that’s all good. And then the
2007 QDR came along and they established
a QDR team—again. This is the standard model
of how a Navy QDR team works, stand up for
one year then disestablish.
The 2007 QDR team did a good job and N81
provided analytic support to them as we al-
ways do. The CNO—this time it was Admiral
Roughead—found that, ‘‘Oh, I’ve got this team
here that works directly for me.’’ That QDR team
was called N00X and it reported directly to
CNO as opposed to reporting to N8—bad idea.
So CNO had this private staff of 30 people—
bright people—doing his bidding. And he
didn’t have to go toN8 to ask them to do his bid-
ding. When the QDR ended he said, ‘‘I’m going
to keep this group. I like this.’’ Herewe have this
N00X of 30 people doing analysis. Really? I
thought we got over that.
There is no N6/N7 but now there is an
N00X that works directly for CNO, and then
there’s N81 supposed to be the analytic service
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provider. They’re doing their best in N00X to
not keep a secret but CNO holds things closely,
so this was not a good scene. There wasn’t the
same level of friction there had been between
the old N6/N7—N70 and N81 but there was
still some friction. Admiral Roughead valued
his ability to have some independent work
done. Also, the N8wasn’t necessarily as respon-
sive andwanted to see the stuff that N81 did be-
fore it went to CNO and that slowed it down
and CNO didn’t like that.
Now we have a N00X operating semi-inde-
pendently, somewhat in conflict with N81. They
have their own staff and they have their own
budget. Then Admiral Greenert came aboard
as the CNO in 2011. He got advice from the
CNO Executive Panel—Irv Blickstein was on
the CNO Executive Panel—he’s retired as an
SES by now. And Irv said, ‘‘You know, this is
dumb. You shouldn’t have a N00X that’s this
big. You should merge them into N81.’’
I’ve known Admiral Greenert since he was
a Lieutenant Commander. He and I served to-
gether in N80. When I was the 812 branch head,
building these ‘‘uber briefs,’’ he was the 801
chief programmer receiving them and using
them to build a POM. He and I were O-6s to-
gether and good friends. He invited me in for
a privatemeeting before he became CNO. I said,
‘‘This N00X stuff has to stop. You’ve got to dis-
establish them and just give their work to us in
N81.’’ He came aboard and that’s what he did.
We had an offsite with the N00X crowd and
worked out the details amicably; thenwe inherited
most of them and their money and their missions.
They had a few other missions that they
were doing that were in addition to what N81
had been doing. They had been doing briefings
for CNO called Futures. They were responsible
for theASW ‘‘Cross Functional Team’’ and a few
other things. We inherited all those missions
with the people and with the money. N81 had
110 people and a gigantic budget and there
was nobody left on the playing field to do any
form of analysis for the Navy at the headquar-
ters level except N81.
Frankly, that’s much easier to explain to
people than all the other, ‘‘We do this but they
do some of it too,’’ and then you try to explain
what the business rules are that sort this out.
You just can’t. Now there is only one analytic
service provider in the Navy headquarters.
There is only one budget and N81 has a culture
of customer service in addition to a culture of
where they’re double-hatted as 00X. There they
can work directly for CNO if there is something
special that CNO wants done, which is fairly
rare but not zero for Admiral Greenert.
That was sort of the end state of how N81
got to be as big as it is, with all the money that
it has, with the very broad range of missions it
has, ranging from producing emerging threat
briefings and futures briefings for CNO to run-
ning the NNOR process—the Non-Nuclear
Ordnance Requirements process—to running
the ASW Cross Functional Team to doing cam-
paign analysis to doing all force structure anal-
ysis. All that is ultimately accumulated into one
place, in N81.
Bob Sheldon:Could you talk about the nature
of those 110 folks—how many are civilian ver-
sus military, how many ops analysts?
Trip Barber: Yes, it was about 70 military
and 40-some civilians (including maybe eight
contractors—secretarial and computer informa-
tion technology (IT) types).At somepoint in there,
we had shifted from a model where civil service
billets were rare in OPNAV, and went through
this big rigmarole in about 2012 where if people
are doing work that is inherently governmental,
they should be government people. Therefore,
we’re going to grow the official civilian billet
structure of theOPNAVstaff and reduce the num-
ber of contractors. And we’ll save money because
the civilians are cheaper—which they are.
While I was the deputy in N81, we went
from having 10 government civilians to having
about 35 government civilians all due to
insourcing jobs that had been done by contrac-
tors that, frankly, was inherently governmental
work. We went through that transition while I
was a deputy in N81 to one of leading a staff
where the civilian part is almost all government
service civilians. And when we hired people in
the new government billets, we hired people
that had degrees in ops analysis or equivalent.
We also imposed a requirement on the mil-
itary detailers to send us officers who were
graduates of the NPS OA curriculum. We get
first rights of refusal on graduates andwewon’t
interfere with the progression of their career if
they really need to go do something else to be
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promotable. But all else being equal, if they need
a shore staff tour, that would be us. We raised
the number of themilitary that haveOAdegrees
to about 20 out of 70.
You may ask, ‘‘Why isn’t it 70 out of 70?’’
Well, fighter pilots don’t get OA degrees by
and large. But you still need some fighter pilots
in your organization. You need Marines in the
organization, but the ones we were offered
never were from the group of Marines with
OA degrees yet we still needed them for their
operational experience. And we need all these
different Navy designators from medical ser-
vice corps to supply corps to whatever, only
a couple of which actually send people to the
OA curriculum at NPS. We needed people for
their professional background in their particu-
lar specialty, but in many specialties you can’t
go to NPS to get an OA degree, so that profes-
sional background trumps the OA degree. By
and large in the surface line, you have every ex-
pectation that you can get upwardly mobile
OA-degreed people to fill the billets. In aviation
you can get people who are helicopter or mari-
time patrol pilots or naval flight officers with
OA degrees but not fighter pilots.
The aviators may or may not be upwardly
mobile. And the submarine community, you
can’t get very many at all. But you need subma-
riners in N81. So you just have to put together
a work force that has enough OA degreed peo-
ple but also the right mix of professional war-
fighting skills to be able to do effective
analysis. I think I’ve recounted pretty much
the history.
Bob Sheldon: Is the analysis that you’re doing
supporting mainly Navy at the Pentagon level
or do you support OEF (Operation Enduring
Freedom) and OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom)
kinds of analysis as well?
Trip Barber: It’s not current year analysis.
The purpose of doing analysis in N81 is to in-
form budget and force structure decisions for
the future Navy. Every now and then we would
get dragged into some form of current year anal-
ysis because the fleets don’t have a very robust
analytic capability by and large, although
PACFLT has a decent one. But by and large that
was not our preference.
The Chief of Naval Operations has noth-
ing to do with operations. He does not run
the operating force of the Navy. He buys the
future Navy. N81 is there to serve the CNO
in his job of shaping and buying the future
Navy. That’s the nature of the analysis that’s
done there.
Bob Sheldon:Has your time horizon changed
over the years—how far into the future are you
doing analysis to support?
Trip Barber: 20 years into the future by and
large—nomore than 20 years. But you can’t just
do a couple of years because you’re making de-
cisions on acquisition programs that are going
to go into research and development (R&D)
and then procurement and not fielded for
10-plus years and not complete buying out their
inventory for 20 years. That’s really the focus. It
can’t be current year because current year is al-
ready paid for.
Bob Sheldon: One of the problems you’ve
talked about in the past is the compartmental-
ized special access programs (SAPs)—how to
analyze those between the Services. Any further
comments on that?
Trip Barber: For the work we did in N81, we
were appropriately cleared for Navy work. I
was cleared for most of the Air Force programs.
I was aware of them and I made sure that we
didn’t do anything that was dumb with respect
to what I knew they could do but I couldn’t tell
anybody what they could do. I guided our anal-
ysis to make sure that it was done with due
regard for Air Force SAP capabilities. But the
ability to integrate their SAP capabilities and
ours in a single analytic framework was sort of
the ‘‘holy grail’’ of program analysis and not re-
ally achievable at the individual Service level.
It’s potentially achievable at the OSD level and
the Joint Staff level—I think the Joint Staff has
made some efforts in that regard.
OSD makes efforts episodically but the
whole joint analytic process is just broken. Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
has not done a good job of managing it from
my perspective. Periodically there would be
joint analytic activities where there would be
a team that was looking at a subject at the SAP
level—the next generation bomber or the next
whatever. But it was always subject specific. It
was not pervasive across the whole joint force
of what’s the whole range of capability for the
future at the analytic level. The SAP-level joint
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analytic stuff was only confined to individual
programs.
Periodically I would be brought in as the
duty Navy hostage in one of those for the next
generation ‘‘whatever.’’ I would be theNavy per-
son read-in to the Air Force stuff and brought in
so I was aware of what they were doing. Every
now and then I would get to bring one action of-
ficer in there with me but we never got to that
point where we could take that information
and integrate it into our modeling in N81.
When we did team campaign analysis with
Air Force A9, our work had slightly different
rules than they used. But both of us designed
our participation in widely distributed cam-
paign analysis with due regard to what each
of us knew separately about our separate Ser-
vice SAP capabilities and at the top I was aware
of all of them. We made sure that the team and
the Air Force counterparts at the SES level were
aware.
We tried to orchestrate the dual-service
campaign analysis process so that it was coordi-
nated. But I can’t say that it was a fused and in-
tegrated process at all levels of classification. I
wish it could have been but there were just too
many administrative impediments.
Bob Sheldon: You talked a lot about cam-
paign analysis, the modeling and simulation,
the mix of that compared to spreadsheet analy-
sis. Has the mix of the kinds of techniques
evolved over the decades you’ve been there?
Trip Barber: We do a lot more of it. We did
not do campaign analysis when I first arrived
in N81 as a Captain in 1994. We began the pro-
cess of developing campaign analysis while I
was there on that tour. It became mature after
I left and had become fully developed when I
came back as an SES. The business rules that I
established in N70 and that I took to N81—they
were the business rules for thewholeNavy—were
that we are going to design the Navy on the
basis of campaigns. We’re going to use four
campaigns to do it. Each of them is a defense
planning scenario campaign. I can’t name
the adversary countries at the unclassified
level but you know who they are—it’s the
usual suspects and the fourth one is the Global
War on Terror or whatever it is you call what
we do around our world every day of influ-
encing, shaping, and chasing bad guys short
of a force-on-force, nation-state versus nation-
state war.
There are the four campaigns and we do
campaign analysis of all of them, and allmission
analysis has to be grounded in those campaigns.
If you’re going to do mission analysis of a mis-
sion area, the concept of operations (CONOPS)
that you use to do that mission analysis has to
be extracted from one of those campaigns.
Through the process of doing those campaigns,
you adjudicate what the correct role is for sur-
face and air and submarine and Air Force and
Navy because they’re joint campaigns.
You sort out who is the best to do par-
ticular missions because you play it out in the
campaign—if that wasn’t the right choice, you
lose.Gofix it andgoback and iterate the campaign
until you have a successful campaign. And then
that defines what it is that each type of platform
and each warfare specialty area really needs to
be able to do and how well they need to be able
to do it. The metrics of success at the mission
area are referenced back to the campaign and
you only need to be as good at each, such as
ASW, as it takes to win the war; you don’t have
to be perfect at ASW. Now if you are really bad
at ASW, you put at risk success in the whole
war. That’s not good enough—that’s ‘‘red’’ (on
a red-yellow-green stoplight chart). But if
you’re good enough at ASW that the war prog-
resses, even if you’re not as good as you wish
you could be, then that’s still ‘‘green.’’ That
doesn’t go well with sponsors who want to be
perfect at each of the areas because it’s their pro-
grams. So there’s a tension between the spon-
sors and N81 over that framework of reference.
The sponsors would call all of our mission
areas red because in no case do we meet all re-
quirements.WhenN81 surveys theNavy through
the lens of campaign analysiswemay see that one
mission area is red, and that one is red because the
campaign is truly at risk. But others are green; we
did fine. Okay, we lost some things but we had
margins of acceptable losses and they were not
huge but they weren’t zero. And that’s good
enough. We’re not going to spend more money
there to make that better, because this area that’s
red is really hurting and it puts the whole Navy
at risk and we’ve got to fix that.
That framework of campaign analysis was
one that really I invented and imposed so
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therefore campaign analysis gets a lot more
weight in Navy than it used to get, and we tend
to take it a lot more seriously. People pay really
close attention to it and participate in it enthusi-
astically because they know what it means. So
yes, we use campaign analysis more than when
I first started in that job. Interestingly enough,
the OSD’s staff went in the opposite direction,
largely due to Christine Fox’s aversion to it
and disestablishment of campaign analysis in
her organization when she became the director
of OSD CAPE. The other real change in N81 is
the amount of analysis that we did that went
up with the budget, but it went up because we
became the sole service provider.
The sponsors all have tons of analysis that
they need to have done to decide what their fu-
ture programs should be. They were doing it on
their own previously, sometimes by ripping off
Program Executive Officer (PEO) acquisition
program money and just spending it under the
table. Well, we stopped all that. But the work
still has to get done by somebody, and N81 is
the service provider for it. All that workload
that was previously distributed throughout
the staff, and in many cases done semicovertly,
has now landed on N81 making the place a lot
busier. There is a bigger budget and bigger staff,
but a lot of work.
It’s work that others were doing poorly
somewhere out there, and they’re no longer
allowed to do it even if they did it well. It has
to get done at N81. As a result the whole work-
load and level of activity at N81 has gone up
quite a bit over my tenure starting in 1994.
Harrison Schramm: Do you have a favorite
book about analysis? If someone said, ‘‘Hey, I
want to get into analysis, I’m thinking about this
as a career, do you have a book recommendation?’’
Trip Barber: No, I don’t read books about
analysis.
Harrison Schramm: Do you have a favorite
book not about analysis?
Trip Barber: Honestly, OA books put me to
sleep, so no I don’t read those kinds of books.
My reading interests are a lot more diverse than
just ops analysis. I read lots of other things—I
read a lot about defense strategy and policy.
My job as the deputy director in N81 was to
make sure we analyzed the right things with
the right teams and my job was really to be the
scout. You’ve heard me say this since I got to
the organization that the Admiral and the dep-
uty are there to be the scouts to go out and find
the work that matters—the issues that matter.
And figure out what techniques you should
use to set the problem up and approach it.
Let the staff figure out what tools to bring to
bear, but they’ve got to bring them to bear on the
right problems that matter to somebody. And
you’ve got to do it early enough that the de-
tailed work that’s done—meticulously—is com-
pleted at a time when the decision is going to be
made and the information is needed. Because if
the information isn’t available when the deci-
sion is going to be made, the decision is still go-
ing to be made.
My focus was much more on finding the
right issues, making sure that we were after
the right problems and not on the technique
we used. I learned enough about the techniques
that if somebody was using something wholly
inappropriate, I would detect it. But the profi-
ciency level on the staff of N81 was such that I
very seldom found people picking the wrong
technique, but they would regularly pick the
wrong issues if I didn’t keep them on the right
course based on what CNO was interested in.
Much ofmy jobwas not to be the expert on tech-
nique, but to be the expert on what to study.
Bob Sheldon: You decided to retire last year.
Was that the right time in your life to retire?
Trip Barber: Well, I’m still employed. I work
four days a week for one of the companies that
used to be one of our contractors and that I came
to know well and like. You’re eligible to retire
from civil service when you reach age 62 if
you have at least five years of service; earlier
than that age it takes many more years of ser-
vice. But when you turn 62, with five or more
years you can retire. I went 10 years straight do-
ing the N81 job—12 as an SES doing essentially
the same work if you count my N70 time. And
there was no end. I tried to request a change
within Navy and the answer was basically
‘‘no, you’re too good at this and you’re too valu-
able so no, you’ve got to keep doing this.’’ The
only way not to do that anymore was to retire.
In my retirement speech, I said that it’s re-
ally important for people who are in positions
like the one I was in to leave before they burn
out, before they lose the fire and the enthusiasm
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that makes us effective. If you’re not effective,
you may end up getting told that you must re-
tire. But if you’re still effective, you need to
leave before that is no longer true. I’ve seen
quite a number of civilians who didn’t figure
that out and were just there enjoying the job. It
was about them, they were getting so much
pleasure out of the work.
But from the perspective of people outside,
you’re a dead man walking. You were no longer
effective; you were a robot. You have lost the
fire, you just don’t see it yourself anymore.
You have to leave before that happens and I
thought that I was about at that time. I actually
retired on my 63rd birthday. I did stay one year
longer because there was stuff to be finished. I
had a conversation with CNO about not leaving
him high and dry too early in his tenure.
I’d been having conversations for the past
five years with the guy who succeeded me—
Chuck Werchado. He was deliberately groom-
ing himself for the job, going through a series
of jobs that were the right jobs to give him the
broad experience necessary to do the N81B
job. He and I had been talking about when he
could leave the job—the last one he was in be-
fore he went to N81—executive director of the
submarine force. He said he really couldn’t
leave Admiral Connor high and dry back when
I was turning 62. He needed to stay with Admiral
Connor another year and I had some things that
I had to finish as well.
We agreed mutually that the right time was
this past summer, and he was in a logical place
in his progression where he could be available. I
was still short of burnout but I could see it com-
ing and I said, ‘‘You know, this is the time. This
is the time to go do this.’’
Bob Sheldon: I want to backtrack in time and
bring you through your involvement with
MORS. What was your first interaction with
the MORS community?
Trip Barber: I may have gone to an event or
two when I was a Captain in N81. But it didn’t
cross my consciousness that much. I think I
went to one symposium. When I got to N81, I
was determined to build this community of
ops analysis in the Navy and to make N81 the
home of ops analysis. I took it really seriously
that we were the community sponsor and we
have responsibilities; we are going to live up
to those responsibilities to supervise the NPS
and bring people from NPS who graduate from
there in OAdeliberately into the N81 as amatter
of priority. Then I implemented significant pro-
fessional development activities for people who
didn’t have OA degrees. I just felt it was my re-
sponsibility to be the patron of OA in the Navy,
because it needed a patron.
MORS is just part of that portfolio logically.
I embraced MORS wholeheartedly because of
that responsibility I felt that I had to be the patri-
arch of OA in the Navy for that position. N81
did not have that feeling toward ops analysis
when I was there as a Captain. It was not built
into the culture as strongly as it is now. Going
to MORS was not a big deal back then, and I
made it a big deal when I came to N81.
Bob Sheldon: As a MORS Sponsor, what’s
your view on the changes of MORS and how
it’s evolved over the years with the changing
reporting structure within MORS and the fund-
ing structure?
Trip Barber: I contributed Navy funds to
MORS. I forget what the Navy share was,
maybe $80,000 per year. Each of the major Ser-
vices had a share we contributed. That gave us
a role in oversight as a Sponsor, including in-
depth involvement in the MORS finances and
business model and everything. It was a little
frustrating, because in my hobby of rocketry I
was the president of the National Association
of Rocketry. I was running an organization larger
thanMORS as a volunteerwith amember-driven
organization, and I had lots of experience run-
ning that kind of an organization.
I was watching how MORS runs itself, and
the volunteer leaders of MORS don’t have any
clue how to run an organization, really. If it
weren’t for the Sponsors, and for the one trained
professional staff person (Susan Reardon cur-
rently), this organization would have folded be-
cause having a new president every year is
destabilizing. It’s an organizational model that
struggles to succeed. But MORS was funded
enough by government Sponsor money and it
had a comfortable business model of we’re go-
ing to have meetings and people are going to
pay to come to them. They will have rewarding
experiences and we don’t have to work real
hard and this model generates enough cash that
we can just keep going.
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Then life changed when we had the scan-
dals around town about government people
misusing governmentmoney to go to ridiculous
meetings that obviously were nothing like
you’d see at a MORS event, unfortunately. The
whole business model that MORS was comfort-
ably operating in died and that brought a real
crisis to MORS—a financial crisis that really
had to make them rethink the whole model by
which that society operates.
I was there in part of that discussion. I was
throwing in a lot of my experience in running
a different association as part of the discussions,
which is why I took such a significant role in
those discussions. I thinkMORS is better, sharper
focused, coming out of that than it was before.
It’s not as comfortable and they struggle a lot
more to make ends meet and unfortunately, it
is still way too difficult for government people
to come to these meetings. The government is
still not fully recovered from the evil acts of the
organization—whatever it was. I forget which
three letter organization screwed it up for
everybody.
But that’s the way life works in the federal
government. Somebody screws it up for every-
body else by doing something that is just stupid
with poor leadership and no supervision and
then everybody is guilty and the rules are ap-
plied universally to people who were not
guilty and were not doing that and that’s
what happened with the whole set of strictures
on government people attending meetings and
conferences. That has made the whole model
by which MORS operates not function very
well. My perspective has been that this should
be a member-driven organization to a greater
extent. People should want to belong and you
should service the members and they should
feel that they are getting a real value for their
dues.
The rocketry association I ran was entirely
based on member dues. If you didn’t please
the members, they’d walk and you’d die. We
were completely focused on delivering services
that delighted the members. And MORS isn’t.
MORS is focused on getting money from Spon-
sors and they run big meetings and everybody
enjoys the meetings, but listening to the mem-
bers or even bothering to recruit members has
been not part of the business model. And they
still struggle with that. I still think that aspect
of how MORS operates reflects clinging to the
past where the business model is that we run
conferences and people will come to them.
Bob Sheldon: You were selected by MORS to
be a Fellow, to be inducted this coming June.
Your comments on that?
Trip Barber: Fellows are old people—oops.
[Laughter]
I really didn’t expect that honestly, because I
don’t have a degree in ops analysis. I haven’t
been a volunteer in MORS running MORS
events. My paradigm of MORS Fellows is that
they are people who have OA degrees, do pro-
fessionally credible things in MORS and then
are volunteers doing lots of volunteer work for
MORS, and they earn it that way. I really hadn’t
thought that a government Sponsor could earn
it—really, I’m just doing my job. I was putting
a lot more of my heart than just doing my job
into MORS, so maybe that’s why they did it.
I’m really committed to making MORS succeed
and I’ve pushed them really hard.
The Navy owns the contract for MORS, so I
had the unfortunate privilege or responsibility
of being the person to go get the contract for
MORS and to have all the government Sponsors
give MORS money. I got a lot more intimately
involved in the details of MORS and probably
had more MORS work than any Sponsor typi-
cally has to do. I’m trying to think of the justifi-
cation of why somebody would pick me to be
a MORS Fellow. It was a surprise. I had no ex-
pectation that that would occur—it was an
honor. Like the people there, it’s so important
to our community that we have an organization
like that where we can all meet. And what I get
out of it is not so much the presentations, it’s the
conversations that occur in between them.
It’s tremendously valuable to be at a place
where all these other people are and have
a chance to talk to people and find out what
they’re doing. And every now and then there’s
an interesting presentation that doesn’t get in
the way.
Bob Sheldon: In your rocketry, do you study
Werner von Braun and other historical aspects
of rockets?
Trip Barber: Yes, I’ve read about them. I have
not focused so much on rocketry history. I’m
aware of it. This convention that I was just at this
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past weekend, one of my classmates from MIT
was there. He was an astronaut, flew the shuttle
four times. I went to see him fly three of the four
times; I was down at the Cape watching him
take off. I was down there for Apollo 15. I am
a big enthusiast of the space program and a con-
sumer of its history.
Harrison Schramm:What’s the biggest rocket
you have ever shot?
Trip Barber: Personally—70 pounds, eight
feet tall. It sits in my garage. I’ve got a picture
of it if you want to see it!
Harrison Schramm: How high did that end
up going?
Trip Barber: 5,600 feet—it’s a gigantic motor.
I was flying it on an East Coast launch sitewhere
if you go much higher than that you’re in dan-
ger of decorating a tree somewhere. If you fly
rockets outwest, you can put amuch biggermo-
tor in it than that and it’ll go much higher. But I
do rocketry most often at the ‘‘finesse’’ end of
the spectrum, small rockets with very fine
craftsmanship. I’m a member of the US team
that goes to the world rocketry championships
every two years.
I just came back from the 2014 champion-
ships in Bulgaria where we fly much smaller
models. They’re 500 mm long, they weigh
maybe 10–20 grams. They don’t go very high,
but it’s based on performance. I actually won
a medal at this year’s championships; I was
the first American to win a medal in six years
at one of these things. That’s at the opposite
end of the size spectrum, but much higher
on the finesse.
Bob Sheldon: You’re at SPA (Systems Plan-
ning and Analysis); what kinds of things do
you work on now?
Trip Barber: I’m the chief analyst. They’ve
not had one before, so we’re trying to figure that
out. They invite me in on all the analytic projects
to look at what they’re doing and tell them
whether it looks good or not good or whether
they could do it better, or the way that they’re
presenting it to the customer is the best way it
could be done. I’m still under the ethics limita-
tions that I can’t represent back to the Navy un-
til July 2015. So my ability to directly work with
the customer and execute projects is pretty lim-
ited here initially.
SPA does work for other people than just
Navy, but the biggest customer is Navy and I
can’t directly touch Navy yet. I have to just look
at stuff and not go to meetings. That will change
but currently I’m involved in a number of the
projects there as a senior advisor. It’s not very
stressful, but that’s OK. When you’ve been op-
erating at the pace that I’ve been operating at
for the last 42 years, to not operate at that pace
anymore takes some getting used to.
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